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TEACHING JURISPRUDENCE IN A 
CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOL 
JEFFREY A. POJANOWSKI† 
Jurisprudence plays an important role in John Breen and 
Lee Strang’s history of Catholic legal education and in their 
prescription for its future.  Legal philosophy in general, and the 
natural law tradition in particular, provide a central justification 
for the existence of distinctive Catholic law schools.  They are 
right to argue so.  As part of the broader Catholic intellectual 
tradition, which emphasizes the unity of knowledge and the 
eternal significance of mundane practice, natural law philosophy 
rejects mere vocationalism.  It can provide the animating form 
and direction of a legal education that is more than one damn 
thing after another in preparation for the bar. 
Of course, many law schools seek to provide more than that: 
they want students to learn how to “think like a lawyer” or “effect 
positive change in the world.”  In modern or postmodern hands, 
however, those aims come with related dangers.  Technique 
without telos raises the risk of educating an army of 
Thrasymachuses.1  A passion for justice, when unmoored from a 
stable moral framework, engenders an emotionalism that can 
lead to ideological excess or the cynicism that flows from its 
disappointment.2  In either direction, crude instrumentalism 
lurks in the wings.  Natural law’s moral realism—confident in 
the firm architecture of the normative universe but humble about  
 
 
† Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. 
1 See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 338c (Allan Bloom trans., 3d ed. 2016) (“ ‘Now 
listen,’ [Thrasymachus] said. ‘I say that the just is nothing other than the advantage 
of the stronger.’ ”). 
2 Cf. Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 167–68 
(1990) (“I became a legal academic instead. The possibilities for normative 
speculation seemed endless. I would write for the Warren Court . . . forever . . . and 
no one would dare call me on it. Yes. And I would write the great American utopian 
chain novel—each chapter more morally appealing than the last. I would argue that 
in the future, we should all be really moral . . . for even more than fifteen minutes.” 
(alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
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the limits of reason on the details—seeks to place law on firm 
ground while orienting and dignifying the craft and technique 
necessary for completing law’s many contingencies. 
Sounds good on paper—a promissory note for a different, 
better, kind of legal education.  But can we deliver?  As Breen 
and Strang demonstrate in their book, a number of talented legal 
academics strove to reform Catholic legal education in this image 
in the middle of the twentieth century, but failed.3  The 
challenges were legion: a dearth of hirable faculty who could 
convey this vision, an apathy at the law faculty and university 
levels, and the dissipation and fragmentation of the neo-Thomist 
intellectual movement that inspired the reform in the first place. 
Things are no easier today.  The pool of candidates to staff 
such a law school is even smaller, what with feeble catechesis, 
the waning institutional strength of the Church, and the 
increased secularization of American society and education.  
With most Catholic law schools following the ambient culture in 
the past fifty years, most faculty would be downright hostile, 
rather than merely indifferent, to reorientation around natural 
law jurisprudence and the broader Catholic intellectual tradition.  
And while there are green shoots in Catholic philosophy across 
the country, we are enjoying nothing like the revival in Catholic 
learning the post–World War II period witnessed.  Compared to 
our predecessors who failed, we are less knowledgeable of, or less 
confident in, the promises of the Catholic intellectual tradition in 
general and natural law jurisprudence in particular. 
All this and more applies to many students at Catholic law 
schools, who may be no better catechized or no more receptive to 
the Catholic intellectual tradition than the faculty and 
administration at would-be reforming schools.  Just as in the 
earlier eras of Catholic legal education, most law students enter 
our doors for the keys to a professional career or to advance 
political causes they hold dear.  Some enjoy a Catholic ambiance 
that has a similar vibe to that of their high school or college, but 
far fewer than was the case at the time of Brendan Brown’s failed 
revolution.  More will be indifferent or even hostile, given the 
extent that rankings and financial aid packages (rationally) drive 
students’ selection of law schools. 
 
3 For examples of early reform manifestos, see Brendan F. Brown, 
Jurisprudential Aims of Church Law Schools in the United States, a Survey, 13 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 163 (1938); James Thomas Connor, Some Catholic Law School 
Objectives, 36 CATH. EDUC. REV. 161 (1938). 
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It’s not a pretty picture, but as Christians, Catholics can 
choose no attitude besides hope.  Grace, moreover, works upon 
nature, and we have no choice but to hope while working smart 
and hard in the fields we are given.  Catholic legal education may 
be at mustard seed status, but we all know what Christ said 
about that.4  What kind of hope is there for natural law 
jurisprudence in a scattering time?5 
I hardly have the answers, but I can offer a small lesson 
from my experience teaching jurisprudence at Notre Dame, one 
of the few remaining law schools in the nation that still requires 
the course.6  As a law school where the Catholic character remains 
comparatively strong among the faculty and the student body, 
Notre Dame likely offers the best-case scenario for what the 
beginning of reform in our era can look like.  The challenges 
remain substantial, but nine years of teaching the course sheds 
light on what can make such a course more successful, or at least 
less of a failure. 
Unsurprisingly, many of the students in my jurisprudence 
class are enrolled because they are interested in graduating, not 
because they are interested in the moral foundations of our legal 
system.  A handful indeed have such interest, and a number 
remain open to the possibility that the class is not in fact a waste 
of their time.  A jurisprudence teacher in such a required class 
therefore has the task of (a) teaching the committed, (b) engaging 
the persuadable, and (c) changing the minds of some of the 
resentful.  The task is even trickier when the teacher is, like me, 
a poorly catechized, sloppily self-taught Catholic revert with a 
formal Thomistic education consisting of one day’s worth of 
discussing the Summa in a college Great Books course. 
I did not appreciate these facts when I crafted the first 
instantiation of the course.  Inspired by the sweeping ambition of 
my college’s Great Books sequence7 and the theoretical 
 
4 See Matthew 17:20 (New American). 
5 I’ve adopted this phrase from the title of Eric Miller’s book, HOPE IN A 
SCATTERING TIME: A LIFE OF CHRISTOPHER LASCH (2010).  
6 As I am amply informed by my friends abroad, required jurisprudence courses 
are far more frequent elsewhere in the common-law world. 
7 See Humanities Sequence, PRINCETON U. HUMANISTIC STUD., 
https://humstudies.princeton.edu/humanities-sequence/ (last visited June 20, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/P4AM-CGGH]. 
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sophistication of my law school jurisprudence course,8 I 
assembled a magisterial two-volume packet that took the 
students from the Ancient Greeks to Critical Legal Studies in 
order.  The course was an utter failure.  A wag commented in the 
course evaluation that the class felt like being enrolled “in the 
History of Magic at Hogwarts,” and in retrospect, that was not 
far from the mark.  For the student interested in such a story, 
the class could have been a success, though I would have had to 
have done a better job connecting themes across the march of 
history.  For most, however, the course was a succession of thinkers 
and arguments often impenetrable, abstract, and ordered most 
obviously by historical sequence, but with little other thematic 
sense.  Whatever the value in the principle, in practice it was 
unbearable for the resentful and baffling to many of those open to 
persuasion. 
Nor would a more didactic course have been more successful.  
I could imagine a course that leads with a close reading of 
Thomas’s Treatise on Law, parses the work of the neo-
Scholastics, and perhaps teaches modern alternatives with an 
eye toward debunking them.  Even if this were the correct way to 
teach the tradition—and I am not convinced it is—such a course 
could engage a group of students looking to ground the law in 
their deeply held faith, if taught by a dynamic teacher deeply 
learned in the tradition.  But today, many students would regard 
such a course as arid, alien catechesis at best, or irrelevant or 
annoying proselytization at worst. 
On the other hand, one cannot play it safe by retreating to a 
jurisprudence class more traditional in modern lights.  Even if 
one is satisfied with the analytic canon of Hart, Fuller, Dworkin, 
and Raz (with a sprinkling of John Finnis to Catholic taste), such 
a course can be a march in the desert for conscripted students.  
And, with due respect to my friends in analytic jurisprudence, I 
must agree that the students have a point.  I take great interest 
in pondering whether the rule of recognition can be capable of 
value-neutral evaluation or whether it must rest on normative 
criteria,9 but I am also well aware that “[l]egal interpretation 
 
8 See Jurisprudence: Legal Ideals, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/ 
academics/curriculum/catalog/default.aspx?o=74043 (last visited June 20, 2020) 
[https://perma.cc/55J8-SBAQ]. 
9 See generally Brian Bix, On the Dividing Line Between Natural Law and 
Positivism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1613 (2000) (identifying this as a central 
question in general jurisprudence). 
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takes place in a field of pain and death.”10  The refinements of 
modern analysis hardly capture the urgency, and possible 
fascination, of the moral questions law raises once you are willing 
to engage the terrain or look under the surface, as opposed to 
stepping back to Olympian heights of abstraction.  The big, 
conceptual questions are important ones, but I began to think 
their importance was best conveyed indirectly, at least to those 
forced to take jurisprudence. 
After a few years of experimentation, and in light of these 
reflections, I have hit upon a formula that works reasonably well, 
or at least less badly than the alternatives I have tried.11  I build 
the class around two basic, related questions: (1) Why do we have this 
institution called law? And (2) given our answer to question (1), what 
is the best way for officials, lawyers, and citizens to go about 
operating that institution? 
In answering those questions, we don’t start with Thomas or 
even John Finnis.  Rather, we start with The Path of the Law, for 
Holmes has framed so much of the legal culture’s social and 
moral imaginary, and the essay distills it for readers in pure 
form.12  Then we proceed to five different modules, each of which 
consists of four classes.  Each module presents a different set of 
answers to the basic questions we raise at the beginning.  As I 
currently teach it, the sequence is Legal Realism, Rule 
Formalism, Dworkinian Moral Principles, Legal Traditionalism, 
and then Natural Law. 
Rather than giving an abstract exposition of each of the five 
“takes,” the units show that thinking in action: we have a class on 
common law, statutory interpretation, constitutional interpretation, 
and then a class providing a theoretical roundup that pulls the 
themes together.  Each of the first three substantive classes in a 
unit, moreover, pairs a short scholarly article with a case 
exemplifying that take on law’s purposes and execution.  For 
example, the common law class on legal realism pairs Herman 
Oliphant’s “A Return to Stare Decisis”13 with the California 
Supreme Court’s decision in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
which allows the students to see Judge Traynor formulate and 
defend strict products liability while picking apart the majority’s 
 
10 Robert M. Cover, Essay, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 
(1986). 
11 An edited version of my current syllabus is attached as an appendix. 
12 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
13 Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 AM. BAR. ASS’N J. 71 (1928). 
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attempt to rule for the plaintiff within the strained confines of res 
ipsa loquitor.14  In the Rule Formalism class on statutory 
interpretation, the students read an obscure case in which 
Justice Marshall and Justice Scalia team up to bounce a 
meritorious case on a technicality15 against the backdrop of 
Frederick Schauer’s essay, “Statutory Construction and the 
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning.”16  And so on. 
The goal of this part of the course is not, or not merely, to 
introduce them to a variety of perspectives on the nature and 
purpose of law.  They do gain those perspectives, and I strive to 
demonstrate the appeal of each position, along with its attendant 
weaknesses.  Nor is the goal of this part of the course to be 
merely a philosophically enriched legal methods class.  Still, 
compared to the average doctrinal course, they get more 
systematic engagement with the art of precedential reasoning, 
textualist and purposivist statutory interpretation, and methods 
of originalist and living constitutionalism.  In both respects, a 
student with purely instrumentalist aims could profit from this 
course as a practical, how-to guide to figuring out what makes 
different judges tick and gaining facility in the second-level 
moves that savvy courts and litigators make in interesting cases.  
One might even suspect that this practical aspect is intended to 
get skeptical students on board.  (“Come for practical lawyering, 
stay for the contemplation of law’s moral purposes.”)  
Yet, the purpose of this five-part sequence is to suggest, 
without bullying or propagandizing, that the natural law 
tradition has something to say to us today.  My point, which 
students are free to accept or reject (with no consequences for 
their grades in either direction!), is that the natural law tradition 
integrates whatever is appealing about the previous approaches 
we discussed.  Like Legal Realism, it recognizes that positive law 
is a product of human choice for human purposes, though it seeks 
to avoid the value skepticism or naturalist metaphysics of many 
Realists.  Its recognition of the value of positive, entrenched 
norms gives a moral underpinning to rule formalism’s insights 
that is richer than Hobbesian or rule-utilitarian decisionism.  
With Dworkin, the natural lawyer recognizes that law lives a 
 
14 Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
15 Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988). 
16 Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordination Function of 
Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231. 
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double life,17 providing historic, created positive law that is 
informed, critiqued, and undergirded by non-posited moral norms 
and principles.  With its recognition that many questions of 
practical reason are undetermined, however, it avoids the 
extravagance and the moral heroism of Hercules.  Like the 
traditionalist, the natural lawyer appreciates that practical 
reasoning in law is similar to Aristotelian phronesis, not simply 
reduced to bare rule-following or moral deduction, while at the 
same time demonstrating a cultivated, community-informed craft 
instinct more determinate and less arbitrary than policy whim.  
At the same time, its insistence that absolute moral norms 
provide the outer frame for such practical reasoning prevents the 
traditionalist’s epistemic humility from descending into moral 
particularism. 
Similarly, while the students will learn the tricks of the 
trade in construing precedent and interpreting legal texts, they 
will take on the more important lesson that our methodological 
arguments are moral arguments about how best to operate our 
legal system, which itself is ultimately a moral project serving 
the purposes of promoting the common good and protecting 
individual human rights.  It can never be (human) law all the way 
up, even if you conclude, for moral reasons, that law’s purposes are 
best served more frequently than not by constraining law-appliers 
through formal, entrenched posited rules. 
But even if the students follow me this far—and by the time of 
the natural law unit comes around, I let them know what I’ve been 
doing—it’s not all sweetness and light.  For even if the natural law 
tradition in theory can provide a framework for integrating the 
truths in our fragmented jurisprudential landscape, there 
remains Arthur Leff’s lurking, haunting question: “Sez who?”18  
There’s a formal elegance to the argument of my course, but 
 
17 See 4 JOHN FINNIS, Adjudication and Legal Change, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS 397, 397 (2011) (“Law has a double life. It is in force as a matter 
of fact . . . . But it has its force by directing the practical reasoning of . . . persons and 
groups . . . . [F]acts count in practical reasoning only by virtue of some further, 
normative premise(s) . . . .”)  
18 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 
1229, 1230 (“Imagine, now, a legal system based upon perceived normative 
propositions–oughts–which are absolutely binding, wholly unquestionable, once 
found. Consider the normative proposition, ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery.’ Under 
what circumstances, if any, would one conclude that it is wrong to commit adultery? 
Maybe it helps to put the question another way: when would it be impermissible to 
make the formal intellectual equivalent of what is known in barrooms and 
schoolyards as ‘the grand sez who’?”). 
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there remains the pressing question of whether its premises in 
fact hold.  Do we believe there is, in fact, a moral reality out there 
framing our deliberation about first-order questions of justice 
and second-order questions about who ought to answer them and 
how?  One that is objective and accessible to humans for 
providing nonarbitrary guidance?  It is comforting (and true!) for 
the natural lawyer to note that many questions are 
underdetermined, but if invoked too much, at some point the 
student may suspect that determinatio is a crutch, a dodge, or a 
feint into a kind of Hobbesian second-best that values settlement 
over all else. 
With nonjudgmentalism, casual emotivism, and “you do you” 
ensconced as leading doctrines of our day, invoking a universal 
moral order or objective truth about human flourishing is 
decidedly countercultural, and not in the way that generates a 
frisson of bad-boy affirmation in an iconoclastic age.  At best, it 
invokes spooky, glow-in-the-dark Things We Don’t Believe in 
Anymore; at worst it threatens a scolding, pluralism-crushing 
moral totalitarianism.  Now, it’s all well and good to trot out the 
fact that we all agree the Nazis, the Fugitive Slave Law, and the 
Black Codes were bad, or to demonstrate the logical argument 
that moral relativism is self-contradicting, but that can only take 
us so far.  So that is where my course transposes into a different 
key. 
Shifting from cases and arguments, we read Steve Smith’s 
delightful and accessible book, Law’s Quandary, which is a 
MacIntyre-haunted meditation on how our legal practice 
presupposes a richer metaphysical framework we profess to no 
longer embrace.19  Drawing on the work of Joseph Vining,20 
however, Smith offers a paradoxical (and more hopeful) twist 
on MacIntyre’s After Virtue,21 suggesting that the stubborn 
persistence of our legal practices, despite our apparent 
disenchantment, points to the fact that we believe far more than 
we let on.  And perhaps that we cannot help but believe.22  
(Perhaps because it is written on the heart?)  Law, from this 
perspective, is an “opening” out of the iron cage, the immanent 
frame, or whatever your favorite metaphor is to describe the 
 
19 STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004). 
20 Id. at 170–75 (discussing JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP (1995)). 
21 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (3d ed. 
2007). 
22 See SMITH, supra note 19, at 174–75. 
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limits of our current dispensation.  More importantly, rather 
than fusillading the students with the necessity of the natural 
law, the book seeks to elicit the realization that the stubborn 
belief rests within them, even when part of them professes doubt.  
As in the movie Scream, the call of the natural (eternal?) law is 
coming from inside the house. 
The course, like Smith’s book, closes with a gesture, rather 
than final theorems, proofs, or Thomistic quaestiones.  With an 
echo of MacIntyre’s concluding choice between Nietzsche or 
Aristotle,23 we read an excerpt of Posner’s pragmatist’s 
manifesto24 and Albert Alschuler’s assault of Holmes’s caricature 
of the natural law tradition.25  At that point, the students can 
contemplate their choice and ponder which way points toward 
flourishing.  In a different time, or perhaps with a different, more 
learned, and more skilled professor, we would close in a less 
tentative fashion.  (I am neither Trotsky nor St. Benedict.26)  At 
this point, and with my limited abilities, however, I am content 
to gather the scattered seeds, pull some weeds, and hope we can 
cultivate even richer pastures in the future. 
 
23 See After Virtue: Nietzsche or Aristotle, Trotsky and St. Benedict, in MACINTYRE, 
supra note 21, at 256–63. 
24 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454–69 (1990). 
25 Albert W. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt Against Natural 
Law, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 491 (2009). 
26 See MACINTYRE, supra note 21, at 263 (“We are waiting not for a Godot, but 
for another—doubtless very different—St. Benedict.”). 
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APPENDIX: SYLLABUS EXCERPT 
 
JURISPRUDENCE 
PROFESSOR JEFF POJANOWSKI 
Course Description and Goals 
What is Jurisprudence?  You may get as many answers to 
the question as you get answerers, but this class will focus on 
some key questions: Why do we have law, and how do our 
answers to that first question shape our thinking about how law 
and legal reasoning should work? 
Here is another way of thinking about this jurisprudence 
class.  A doctrinal class usually consists of two parts: (1) the rules 
of a subject themselves and (2) “other.”  In this “other” we reason 
by analogy, talk about legal principles, identify broader themes, 
criticize doctrine on political, moral, or economic terms, and try 
to grasp broader themes about the subject and how it changes.  
This “other” is usually what lawyers get paid for: anyone with a 
decent grasp of legal English and a Westlaw account can look up 
rules.  Yet legal education only teaches this “other” indirectly—as 
a byproduct of learning the rules themselves.  This class is an 
attempt to look more systematically at this free-floating aspect of 
your legal education and, well, try to make it less free-floating.  
In that respect, Jurisprudence is in fact intensely practical. 
But it is not entirely practical, and that’s a good thing.  This 
class gives you an opportunity to reflect on the nature and aims 
of the practice to which you are about to devote your career.  
Robert Cover was only being slightly dramatic when he said, 
“Legal interpretation takes place on a field of pain and death.”  
Legal rules and their application do result in death sentences, 
prison terms, fines, injunctions, and the forcible taking of 
property.  They can also enforce important promises, protect the 
weak from the strong, and secure our peace, property, and self-
direction.  Given the gravity of law, any legal education seems 
incomplete without some space for critical reflection on what law 
is, what it is for, how this powerful social institution connects to 
morality and the common good, and how you, as a lawyer, play a 
role in that. 
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Reading Assignments 
A tentative schedule of assignments is set forth below. 
Introduction 
• Class 1:  
• Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 
Legal Realism 
• Class 2: Common Law 
• Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 
1944). 
• Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 AM. 
BAR. ASS’N J. 71 (1928). 
 
• Class 3: Statute 
• NCTA v. Brand X, 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (opinion of 
Thomas, J.). 
• Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 
863 (1930). 
 
• Class 4: Constitution 
• Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (opinions of 
Rehnquist, C.J., and Marshall, J.). 
• Thomas Reed Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of 
Constitutional Law, 15 J. PHIL. PSYCHOL. & SCI. 
METHODS 645 (1918). 
 
• Class 5: Theoretical Roundup 
• Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE 
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY (Martin P. Golding & William A. 
Edmundson eds., 2005). 
  
Law as Rules 
• Class 6: Common Law  
• Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (opinion of 
Eagleson, J.). 
• LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, DEMYSTIFYING 
LEGAL REASONING 31–50 (2008). 
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• Class 7: Statute 
• Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988). 
• Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the 
Coordination Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. 
REV. 231. 
 
• Class 8: Constitution 
• McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985). 
• Larry Alexander, Originalism, the Why and the What, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (2013). 
 
• Class 9: Theoretical Roundup 
• Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’ ”: 
Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 
530–55 (1999). 
 
Law as Moral Principles 
• Class 10: Common Law 
• MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (N.Y. 
1916) (opinion of Cardozo, J.). 
• Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 
1058–65, 1087–1101 (1975). 
 
• Class 11: Statute 
• United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) 
(opinions of Brennan and Rehnquist, JJ.). 
• Ronald Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A 
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316–31 (1985). 
 
• Class 12: Constitution 
• Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (opinion of 
Stevens, J.). 
• Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading of the Constitution, 
N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 21, 1996. 
 
• Class 13: Theoretical Roundup 
• RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 254–71, 407–13 
(1986). 
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Law as Traditional Practice 
• Class 14: Common Law 
• Sotelo v. DirectRevenue, LLC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 1219 
(N.D. Ill. 2005) (omit discussion sections I, II, IV, & VII). 
• A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, 
in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (2d ser. 1973). 
 
• Class 15: Statute 
• Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (2014) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.). 
• Martin Krygier, The Traditionality of Statutes, 1 RATIO 
JURIS 20 (1988). 
 
• Class 16: Constitution 
• Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 
(2019) (excerpt). 
• Marc O. DeGirolami, First Amendment Traditionalism, 
WASH. U. LAW. REV. (forthcoming). 
 
• Class 17: Theoretical Roundup 
• F.A. Hayek, Freedom, Reason, and Tradition, 68 ETHICS 
229 (1958). 
 
Natural Law Theory 
• Class 18: Common Law 
• Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 
1905) (excerpt). 
• John Finnis, The Fairy Tale’s Moral, 115 L.Q. REV. 170 
(1999). 
 
• Class 19: Statute 
• King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.). 
• RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
219–24, 230–36, 244–49 (2012). 
 
• Class 20: Constitution 
• Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (opinions 
of Douglas and Black, JJ.). 
• Stephen Macedo, The Inescapability of Natural Law, 5 
BENCHMARK 117 (1993). 
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• Jeffrey A. Pojanowski & Kevin C. Walsh, Enduring 
Originalism, 105 GEO. L.J. 97 (2016) (Introduction and 
Part II). 
 
• Class 21: Theoretical Roundup 
• JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 281–
90 (2d ed. 2011). 
 
Law in a Quandary? 
(All page numbers reference to 
STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004)) 
• Class 22: 1–37 
• Class 23: 39–64 
• Class 24: 65–96 
• Class 25: 97–125 
• Class 26: 126–53 
• Class 27: 155–79 
 
Concluding Class 
• RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 454–
69 (1990). 
• Albert W. Alschuler, From Blackstone to Holmes: The Revolt 
against Natural Law, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 491 (2009). 
 
